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Abstract: Since their introduction in 1982, Japanese auto transplants in the
skyrocketed in production, now producing many more cars than are imported. This study
incorporates new refinements and revisions to attempt to identify the main factors that are
responsible for the introduction ofJapanese auto transplants and their massive growth in
production over the last 14 years. The author develops two hypothesesjrom theoretical analysis
of the factors contributing to production decisions. The first is that the voluntary export
restraints (VERs) imposed on the Japanese from 1981-1985 are responsible for bringing the
transplants to the U.S. andfor creating major growth in their production. The second
hypothesis is that after 1985, a different factor was responsible for sustaining growth in
transplant production, the exchange rate. The author relies mainly on theory and observations
of quarterly time series data to support his first hypothesis, but supports the second hypothesis
with both theoretical and improved empirical analyses, with strong results throughout.

I. Introduction
Of the many industries in which the U.S. trades internationally, few can match the fervor
created by the automobile industry. More specifically, the rivalry between US. and Japanese cars
has historically been one of the hottest debated topics across the United States, and not
surprisingly, a very personal issue for the thousands of Americans employed in the U.S. big three
auto makers (Chrysler, Ford and General Motors) and their many parts suppliers. After the oil
crisis in 1973, Japanese cars became extremely popular because of their fuel efficient designs and
excellent reliability, leaving the American auto industry shaken. They lost market share quickly,
unprepared for the changing demand in automobiles and lagging behind the Japanese in quality.
This loss in market share continued into the 1980s, creating great concern among those employed
in the auto industry, as well as the many Americans who shared a sense of pride in American cars.
This passionate sense of pride among staunch U.S. automobile protectionists led to pressure on
the government by unions and other organizations to protect the welfare of the U.S. auto
industry. Most protection has come in the form of tariffs or quotas on imports. In early 1980,
fueled by concern over the U.S. auto industry's loss in market share, the US. government asked
Japan to impose voluntary export restraints (YERs) of 1.68 million units on its automobiles to the
United States from 1982 until 1984. Japan announced in May 1981 that it would comply with the
request.
While the YERs temporarily boosted and protected the US. auto industry's market share,
the YERs caused another significant effect that was certainly unintended by the U.S. government.
Sales of Japanese cars actually increased in the coming years because major Japanese auto makers
started up domestic production in the United States. This paper examines the reasons for
increased Japanese auto production in the United States.
This paper hypothesizes that the YERs of the early 1980s were largely responsible for the
introduction of Japanese domestic production in U. S. auto transplants and, until 1985, for their
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explosive growth. Although the United States-requested VERs expired in 1985 and import
restrictions loosened greatly, Japanese production in the United States persisted at a heightened
pace while exports continually declined over the years following 1986 (Figure 1). The number of
exports depicted in Figure 1 exceed the VER quota because these figures include trucks, vehicles
not covered under the VERs. The author hypothesizes that after the VERs expired, the reason
for Japanese companies' decisions to continue domestic production changed. The appreciated yen
that skyrocketed after 1985 (Figure 2) became the factor responsible for this persistent growth.
Section II will present background information on the research by discussing the related
economic literature. Section ill will discuss the theoretical framework in this project. Section IV
will describe the sources of data and the data used in the empirical model in Section V. Section
VI will discus the results and the paper will conclude with remarks and recommendations for
future research in Section VII.

ll. Backgroun
While many authors such as Goto, Collyns and Dunaway, de Melo and Tare, Krugman and
Richardson acknowledge VERs and the exchange rate as a major reason for increased Japanese
foreign direct investment (FDI) in U.S. transplants, virtually no one has performed a study to
examine the VER's or the yen-dollar exchange rate's direct roles in influencing domestic
production decisions. Graham and Krugman acknowledge both of my hypotheses as being true in
their book, Foreign Direct Investment, but give no support for their assertion. Most literature
about the VERs of the early eighties seeks to quantify the monetary/welfare costs associated with
the quotas. These costs were incurred because Japanese companies were able to reap monopoly
profits by the restricted supply (Figure 3). In addition, Japanese companies were able to
raise their prices effectively and increase profitability by exporting more well-equipped cars than
before (Collyns 151). U. S. companies were also able to raise their prices and make more profits
although to a lesser extent (Collyns 159). These additional costs to the consumer in the form of
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inflated prices was the cost ofthe trade restraints.
Literature by Ries suggests that the VERs had a positive aspect for the Japanese
companies because of the windfall profits associated with the restricted exports (Rjes 259). A
study by de Melo and Tarr also found that the Japanese companies experienced increased profits
because of the VERs. Tllis would suggest that moving operations to the United States in order to
boost production would not be wise since they were earning inflated profits with their restricted
supply, contrary to my hypothesis. It is important to point out that although it may be true that
Japanese companies profited during the times of the VERs, this literature focuses only on the
period oftime willie VERs were at their highest (1982-1985), not on the long run picture. In
focusing only on the short run, this literature has neglected the important issue that in the
automobile industry, the long run view is crucial to the success of any company. Tllis is because
it is an industry in willch established market share is hard to gain and is very important. In the
next section on theory, I will better address these arguments and discuss why Japanese companies
decided to move production to the United States while apparently earning increased profits
because of the VERs.
It seems clear that with a void of literature focusing directly on the research problem, the
project will be breaking new ground and focus on support by theoretical and empirical evidence
rather than past research.
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m. Theoretical Model
The model will include six main factor that have affected the Japanese companies'
production decisions in U.S. auto transplants the most. These main explanatory ariables are: ])
the VERs 2) the exchange rate, 3) wage rates in U.S. and Japanese auto industries, 4) U.S.
economic perfonnance, 5) market share of Japanese automobiles in the United States and 6) parts
availability for producing the automobiles. In this section, I develop a theoretical model that uses
these variables to explain the introduction and rise of Japanese domestic production in U.S. auto
transplants.
J)

The VERs
Underlying all analysis presented in this paper is the assumption that the Japanese auto

producers are profit maximizers. Even though a short run deci ion may create short run windfall
profits, as is the situation of the period ofVERs (Ries 259), it may not create the highest profits.
in the long run because the restricted supply results in loss of market share and, therefore, may
not be the best decision. In a dynamic sense, domestic production must be more profitable for the
Japanese companies or else they would not have made the shift in production.
During the period of VERs, imports were limited at 1.68 million cars from 1981-1983,
and 1.85 million cars in 1984 and 1985. Although VERs officially continued after 1985 at the
level of2.3 million cars, they did not have a significant effect on automakers' decisions because
import levels were well below the VER level of2.3 million units. As pointed out previously,
Japanese car were in high demand in the early 1980s, just as the VERs took effect. Under the
VERs, Japanese companies were faced with a fixed supply under rising demand. This situation
led to higher prices for the automobiles, but does this mean profitability went up as some suggest?
After gaining market share of 21. 8% in 1981 from only 12.2% of the industry sales three years
earlier, Japanese automobiles were clearly in rising demand. A study by Collyns and Dunaway
(1987) indicated that sales of Japanese automobiles would have been 45% higher over the entire
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period of VERs in the absence of the restrictions. It therefore seems very likely that the profits
Japanese companies were losing from a deficit in sales more than outweighed any monopoly
profits earned because of the VERs. Being profit maximizers, Japanese companies recognized
this big problem and searched for a way to supply more cars to the United States. Furthermore,
the Japanese companies did not know whether the restrictions would be lifted or increased
further, putting more pressure on their future earnings. Their answer was to create U.S.
transplants and they quickly began to move production overseas to build cars exempt from the
VERs, Honda being the first in 1982, closely followed by others (Table 1). The VERs seem to be
the main motivating factor in bringing production overseas.

Table 1

Japanese Automobile Assembly plants in U.S.

Japanese ompany

Location

Start year

Honda
Nissan
N1JM1vfI (Joint venture, Toyota and GM)
Mazda
Toyota
Diamond Star (Mitsubishi & Chrysler)
Subaru-Isuzu
Nissan-Ford

Marysville, Ohio
Smyrna, Tennessee
Fremont, California
Flat Rock, Michigan
Georgetown, Kentucky
Nonnal, Illinois
Lafayette, Indiana
Avon Lake, Ohio

1982
1983
1984
1987
1988
1988
1989
1991

Source: Kennev and Florida, ''Japanese Foreign Direct Investment in the United States.

1/

2) The Exchange Rate
ntil 1985, the dollar enjoyed a strong position against the Japanese yen, but after 1985,
the yen appreciated rapidly and has continued in that direction ever since (Table 2). Although
economic theory would suggest that under an appreciated dollar, it would be less attractive for
foreign companies to invest in the United States, we observed considerable growth in FDI in
Japanese auto transplants that started in 1982 and has continued ever since then. While the VER
was the main motivating factor in bringing Japanese nameplates to U.S. transplants in the early
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eighties, manufacturers' incentives changed gears after 1985. After 1985, VERs expired yet fOUf
more transplant operations opened their doors. The problem for the profit maximizing Japanese
companies was no longer a restricted supply, but rather an appreciated yen. With a stronger yen,
it takes more dollars to purchase products imported from Japan. In other words, Japanese goods
would be more expensive relative to domestic goods. If importing the automobiles from Japan,
companies would have to increase their prices to maintain the same income because of the
exchange rate difference, but by doing this, they risk lowering their sales. Although the Japanese
were superior to the United States in cost-cutting manufacturing methods, trying to battle the
effects of the appreciated yen and remain profitable was a sizable challenge (Collyns 1987,
Crandall 1987). By moving production to the United States, Japanese companies effectively
eliminated many of the exchange rate problems associated with importing the automobiles. They
could take advantage of materials and labor that were relatively cheaper for them because of the
strength of their currency, and thus control the prices of their automobiles.
The trend was clear. Before 1985, Japanese companies acted against what economic
theory about exchange rates suggests firms would do. Constrained by the VERs, they invested
heavily in the U.S. although their currency was weak, but after 1985, the behavior of the Japanese
firms clearly complies with investment theory. The VERs were highly instrumental in bringing
production ofJapanese autos to the U. S., to the point of outweighing the effects of the
unfavorable exchange rate, and the appreciated yen has been highly instrumental in sustaining
their growth in domestic production. This trend will be supported by empirical data later in the
paper.

3) Real wage in each country's auto industry
Labor costs are obviously a very important consideration for automobile companies since
they account for a large part of manufacturing costs. As profit maximizing companies, the
Japanese companies would want to produce where the labor was the cheapest, unless other

7

benefits outweighed a higher labor cost. Table 2 shows a comparison between the wages in the
United States and Japan measured with indices that control the exchange rate. The ratio of the
two indices shows this relationship As the number decreases, wages are either increasing in
Japan or decreasing in the United States. By looking at the indices, one can easily see that wages
have risen much more quickly in Japan than in the United States. In fact, until recently, wages in
the United States remained quite constant willIe wages in Japan have risen almost every year.
Wages have been pushed up in Japan over the last decade largely because of a labor shortage
there. This situation makes producing autos in the US. ideal for the Japanese companies. As the
ratio of wages has been getting smaller, the amount of Japanese nameplate autos produced in the
United States has been getting larger. Therefore, the wage rate may also be an important factor
that is responsible for the growing transplant production in the United States.
Although productivity considerations are important for companies, this measure is left out
of my paper. This is for two reasons. First, a suitable and reliable productivity measure, such as
unit labor cost is difficult to obtain. Second, I feel comfortable in leaving tills measure out
because studies have shown (Kenney and Florida 1991, Goto 1990) that Japanese companies have
been highly successful in transferring their efficient production methods to the United States..
Kenney and Florida noted nearly identical productivity in the Honda plant in the U.S. as in Japan.
Therefore, productivity may not be much of an issue for Japanese companies deciding whether or
not to move production to the U. S.
4) U.S. Real CDP
Automobiles are a big-ticket durable good so they are highly sensitive to changes in the
overall state of the economy. Theory would suggest that we would observe lags in production
when the economy is at its worst and boosts in production when it is healthy. For example, in a
recession, many consumers are uneasy about their current financial state and will not make a large
investment in an automobile, whereas during a period of high consumer confidence, buyers will be
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more likely to make a large purchase. However, in the U.S. auto transplants, production has
increased every year, some years at an incredible pace, ev n through recessions. Although
growth rates are not consistent with the growth rates of the economy, one can see by observing

Table 2

Comparison of Real Wages in Auto Industries ofD.S. and Japan

Year

u.s. (1979=100)

1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994

100
108.68
105.11
105.16
103.22
102.68
t03.17
102.13
101.74
100.89
98.61
97.02
97.57
98.07
101.88
105.26

Japan 0979=100)
100
106.27
107.52
110
111.38
112.42
113.25
115.96
116.55
121.34
122.22
121.68
128.7
132.27
126.32
125.35

Index Ratio
1

1.023
.978
.956
.927
.913
.911
.881
.873
.831
.807
.797
.758
.741
.807
.840

Source: Ward's Automotive Yearbook. Multiple Volumes. data adjusted for inflation with CPl (}987 -100)

figure 4 that the general trends of the growth rates in domestic Japanese production at least
somewhat follow the trends of the economy, especially during the recession of 1990 and 1991
when transplant production plunged. The inconsistencies in the growth pattern of Japanese auto
production in the

u.s. as compared to the growth pattern of the economy can be mostly

explained by three main factors: 1) demand for Japanese cars has been high 2) Japanese
companies have relied more and more on domestic production in U.S. transplants to meet the
needs of the U.S. market, and 3) during this time Japanese companies were in the process of
setting up new factories that would obviously cause a great growth in production as they started
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up operations for the first time.
With the first factor, it has already been established that Japanese cars were in high
demand. With such a high demand, we would expect to see them less affected than less desirable
cars by changes in the economy. The second factor is important in explaining why growth rates
of transplant production have been much more active than growth in the economy. As noted
before, the Japanese have been exporting fewer cars to the United States each year and producing
more domestically since 1986 (see Figure 1). These increases in local production are therefore
not only an indicator of high demand for Japanese cars but also of the companies' new found
reliance on domestic production to meet the needs of the North American market because it is
more profitable for them to produce here. Regardless of economic trends, the Japanese were
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producing more of their cars in the United States and less in Japan. The third factor is very
obvious. Once a new transplant started production, there would be a sudden increase in the
number of cars produced, making the growth rate appear abnormally high for that year or the
next. Years of massive growth such as ] 985 and 1989 are evidence of this effect. NUMMI
started in 1984 and Diamond Star, Toyota, and Subaru-Isuzu all started in 1988 and 1989 and
account for the observed abnormally high growth rates.

5) Market Share
To further address the issue of whether the Japanese profited by the VERs, one must
consider the implications oflosing market share in the auto industry. Ries, de Melo, and Tarr did
not consider the importance of market share in their study in which they concluded that Japanese
companies profited by the VERs. Since automobiles are products that are frequently very brand
loyal buyer's items, aut 0 makers' play close attention to market share which can be considered a
rough proxy for preference of automobiles. Once a person purchases a car, assuming the
experience was positive, they are more likely to purchase that brand of car again rather than
another car. Under VERs, Japanese market share was restricted meaning some customers who
would have purchased a Japanese car ended up substituting with an American one. This loss in
market share is difficult to recover. Since these VERs hit at a time when demand for Japanese
cars was just tarting to explode (see Figure 1), the Japanese had no choice but to respond by
shifting production overseas to avoid the VERs and regain profits and market share.
Another important aspect to consider is that with a limited number of exports, companies
could not expand their product line offerings without reducing the exports of another model.
Moving production of the most popular high-volume cars to the U.S., such as Toyota's Corolla or
Nissan's Sentra, freed up space under the quota and allowed the Japanese to continue plans to
offer new imports such as luxury cars, sports cars, and sport utility vehicles without
compromising the sales of other models. Observation of this trend is the fact that the total
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production of the Japanese companies has increased greatly with more types of models offered
than ever. The current trend is that most high volume cars are now produced in the U.S. while
the more expensive models are reserved for production in Japan.
Once the Japanese regained their market share, we would expect to see them continue to
try to increase their market share, not level off. This is because, as profit maximizing companies,
they would have an incentive to continue to increase their sales and earn more profits. In other
words, when the going is good, the good keep going, which is certainly the case we see with
Japanese auto makers who hold about 30% of the US. car market now, about double what they
held fifteen years earlier (Ward's 1996).

6) Parts availability
In Japan, auto producers utilize a close-knit system of suppliers. Within this system,
suppliers who meet the needs of the Japanese companies' unique work organization are highly
reliant on just-in-time (llT) inventory systems. The requirements of suppliers under this system
are much more demanding than traditional US. auto manufacturing. In the early 1980s, many
US. suppliers were inadequate for the Japanese transplants because they lacked the knowledge or
experience with this type of work organization or llT, or they were just unwilling to comply
(Florida and Kenney 106). We would then expect this to be a factor that discourages Japanese
companies from manufacturing here. What is observed by Florida and Kenney (1991) is that
many Japanese companies have strongly encouraged their suppliers in Japan to set up shop in the
United States in order to meet their needs. These suppliers, together with the growing number of
US. companies that accommodate the Japanese organization, make up the first-tier suppliers for
the Japanese, allowing them to manufacture successfully in the United States. This development
has been highly significant in attracting domestic Japanese production.
Before Japanese parts suppliers moved to the United States and U.S. companies adapted
to a llT system, the Japanese imported their engines and drivetrains already assembled. They
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would in some instances essentially ship disassembled cars over that simply needed to be "screwed
together" to be ready for sale. This system worked well for the Japanese because while VERs
were at their highest, there were never any restrictions on parts imports. Although this system
was not as efficient as the supplier networks transplants utilize now, this alternative was the best
for Japanese companies to increase supply while under the restrictions of the VERs. Since then,
the Japanese companies producing in the United States now take advantage of the favorable
exchange rate and improved supplier network and use many more U. S. made parts in their
automobiles (Florida and Kenney 109).

IV. Data Sources and Description
Quarterly time series data from 1980, fourth quarter to 1994 are used in the empirical
model. This period was chosen because it starts two years before transplant production began
and ends with the most recent data available. Data utilized in this project were acquired
overwhelmingly from yearly volumes of Ward's Automotive Yearbook. These specific data
include transplant production, number of imports, market share, and automotive industry wage
rates. Data about the U.S. economy were extracted from the websites of the U.S. Bureau of
Economic Analysis (US BEA) and the St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank, the 1995 edition of World
Tables and the 1995 edition of Business Statistics of the U.S. Exchange rate data were also
acquired from the website of the US BEA. Finding detailed parts supplier data that indicate their
country of origin and main customers proved to be a huge task beyond the scope of this paper, as
Kenney and Florida indicated in their research (107). Hence, this paper will have to rely simply
on a theoretical analysis of the parts suppliers issue, without empirical data to support the theory.
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V. Empirical Model
From the theory section, two main hypotheses emerge:
1) The VER was the factor responsible for bringing Japanese production
to the U.S. and, until 1985 when they expired, for the explosive growth in
production.

2) The appreciation of the yen after 1985, coinciding with the expiration of
the VERs, took over as the main factor that sustained and increased growth
in domestic production of Japanese cars in U.S. transplants.
This section presents the empirical model indicated by theory. The same variables discussed in
theory will be incorporated in the model with the exception of the parts variable for reasons
described earlier. An OLS multiple regression analysis is used to determine whether the variables
explain the hypotheses that are supported by theory. The regression equation takes the form:
PRODUCTIONT.RM,sPLANTs= exo + PIVER + P2YEN/$(VER)+ P3WAGE + P4GDP + PsMKT
Below, each variable is discussed individually in accordance with the two hypotheses put forward
earlier. Table 3 defines the variables of the regression equation.

Independent Variable 1: VER
A dummy variable was utilized in the regression analysis to capture the effects of a VER.
Before a VER is implemented, maximum exports were theoretically determined by total

u.s.

demand for new cars. Although there were production capacity limits, the companies were
allowed to export all the cars they wanted without a VER. While under the VER, a company had
a specified limit on automobiles they could import. In a nut shell, either it was on or it was off A
value of zero was given for years in

bich there was a VER, and a value of one was given for

years in which a VER was not in effect. These values were chosen
because the next variable, YEN/$, is an interactive variable that utilizes the VER variable to turn
the variable on only during the period of no VERs. The importance of this will be explained fully
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in the description of the Yen!$ variable.
The VER variable was lagged by two years, or eight quarters, in the equation. A lag was
incorporated in the equation because it takes time for companies to set up a factory in the states
and begin production. A lag of two years returned the best results for both this variable and the
others. The expected sign of this variable is negative. While restricted by the VERs, we expect
to see Japanese companies producing more in US. auto transplants because of their profit
confining supply shortages, than when they are not restricted.

Table 3
Variable Definitions and their Expected Signs
Variable
Tvpe
Explanation
PRODUCTIONTRANSPLAA'TS Dependent
Number of Japanese nameplate
autos produced in U. S. transplants.

Expected Sign

VER

Independent

Dummy variable indicating when
VERs were in effect. Takes on value
of 0 during VERs, 1 with no VERs.

YEN/$(VER)

Independent

Interactive variable that measures the
Negative
Yen!$ exchange rate during the period
of no VERs. The value of this variable
is multiplied by the value of the VER
variable, effectively turning off the
variable during the period of VERs and
turning it on during the period of no VERs
to isolate the production period hypothesized
to be most affected by the exchange rate.

WAGE

Independent

US./Japan ratio constructed with indices Negative
of real domestic wages in auto production
industries of US. and Japan

GDP

Independent

Real US. GDP in constant 1987 dollars.

MKT

Independent

Japanese companies' market share of
all automobiles sold in the US.
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Negative

Positive
Positive

Independent Variable 2: YEN/$(VER)
This interactive variable measures the effects of the Yen/$ exchange rate after the period
of VERs, a factor hypothesized to greatly influence production in the United States. Since I
hypothesize that this vaIiable is responsible for increases in production only after the period of
VERs, this variable is effectively turned off during the period of VERs through this interaction.
Since the VER variable takes on the value of zero during VERs and one during non VER years,
the variable is only activated during the period of non-VER years. This interaction effect is very
important in supporting the hypothesis since it isolates the period in question.
This variable was lagged two years like the VER variable for the same reasons. Exchange
rates move very quickly and companies deciding to produce in the U.S. because of the more
favorable exchange rate needed time to set up and produce in the states. Furthermore, since
exchange rates can be rather volatile, companies would want to observe the patterns of the
exchange rate for a while before making a major decision like moving production overseas.
Companies like Toyota, Subaru-Isuzu, and Mitsubishi all arrived about two years after the yen
appreciated greatly. Expected sign of this variable is negative because as the Yen/$ exchange rate
increases (more yen to buy a dollar), it would be more expensive to produce in the United States
and companies would choose to produce where it is cheapest.

Independent Variable 3: WAGE
WAGE is a ratio that measures the level of wages in the auto industries of the U. S. and
Japan against one another. This variable is included because labor is a major factor cost in
producing automobiles and affects decisions to produce in the United States. Since an increase in
the value ofthis variable indicates either wages are increasing in the United States or decreasing
in Japan, the expected sign of this coefficient is negative. This is because ifU.S. wages increase
relative to Japanese wages, we would hypothesize that this would cause the Japanese companies
to produce where labor is cheaper (in Japan), thus inhibiting transplant production and resulting in
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a negative sign.

Independent Variable 4: GDP
GDP was included in the regression equation because, as explained in the theory section,
demand for big-ticket durable good, like automobiles, is affected by the state of the economy.
Therefore, this variable had to be included to control for changes in production caused by changes
in the state of the economy. The expected sign for this variable is positive, since one would
expect to see more vehicles being demanded with a healthy economy. This variable was not
lagged because the auto industry responds immediately to changes in demand for autos by
adjusting production accordingly. Furthermore, GDP does not need to be lagged because it was
not responsible for bringing transplants to the US, but it has affected production decisions in
them and needs to be included in the model.

Independent Variable 5: MKT
MKT is the Japanese automakers' market share of all cars sold in the United States. This
variable was also lagged two years in the regression. The MKT variable was included in the
regression because, as explained earlier in the theory section, market share is a very important
consideration for automobile companies because it can be considered a rough proxy for
preference in automobiles. The expected sign for this variable is positive. While arguments can
be made for causality to run both ways, i.e. for increases in production to cause increases in
market share, or increases in market share to fuel increases in production, I will be arguing the
latter. First of all, as market share increases, Japanese companies are obviously selling more
vehicles. These increases in production allow companies to take advantage of economies of scale.
Since many of the costs of producing an automobile are fixed, such as start up costs with the
factories and operational costs of running the factory, additional automobiles can be produced
cheaper as production increases. In other words, the costs can be spread over more and more
automobiles and profits can be maximized. Also, as people's preferences for Japanese
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automobiles increases, i.e. as their market share increases, Japanese companies would respond by
increasing their production to meet the demand and expand their market share.

VL Results
The regression was corrected for auto correlation with the Hildreth-Lu method and run
with OLS estimation. The results of the equation are given in Table 4. The analysis returned
mixed results, with aU variables but one resulting in the predicted sign. All variables are
significant and the adjusted R squared is high, at .94. The results of each variable and how they
apply to the hypotheses will be discussed in this section of the paper.
Hypothesis one was not supported by the results of this model. The VER variable
returned with a coefficient of265922.81, the wrong sign, and was significant. Tills result means
that under the VERs, the model predicts that the Japanese produced about 265,922 Jess autos in
the US. than they would have without the VERs.

Although tills result was unexpected, it is not

necessarily disappointing.
Tills unexpected result may be explained by re-examining US. transplant production
(Figure 1). VERs were in effect 1981,82,83,84, and 85. With the two year lag incorporated in
the model, the observed years with VERs are therefore 1983, 84, 85, 86, and 87. A look at the
production figures shows that although during the period of VERs we see significant growth in
transplant production, the non-VER years following 1987 have even greater growth in
production. Tills observation is a reflection of the increased number of producers in the non-VER
years than in VER years. By 1989, there were seven different transplants in production, but in
1987, only fOUf were operating. With three more transplants in production after the period of
VERs, obviously there would be more production than before.
With that said, it still does not explain why the results do not support the hypothesis that
the VERs brought production to the US. and caused growth in production. For support of tills
hypothesis, one must look at the statistics and rely on theory and the literature of other
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Table 4

Regression Results

Independent Variables
VER

Estimated Coefficient
265922.81
(5.2617)*

YEN/$(VER)

-1090.71
(4.9434)*

WAGE

-208729.23
(6.3095)*

GDP

65.17
(21.7502)*

MKT

11502.18
(6.3043)*

Constant

-291790.90
(11.9766)*

Adjusted R2

.94

Durbin-Watson

1.87

t-statistics are in parentheses

* indicates significance at .0001 level
researchers more than the results of this model. Let us take this in steps. First of all, it is clear
that before the VE s there was no transplant production and during the VER period, four
transplants came to the US. Next, it seems obvious that the Japanese companies were not
moving to the US. during the early eighties because of the exchange rate. During that time, the
high Yen/$ exchange rate made production in the US. more expensive than production in Japan.
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With these two important observations and the previous discussion in the paper in mind, I still
maintain that the VERs were responsible for bringing the first four transplants to the U.S. and
creating growth in transplant production.
A favorable exchange rate for the Japanese that almost perfectly coincided with the
expiration of the VERs made transplant production more attractive and led to the introduction of
new companies and even greater growth in production than before. So yes, there was less
production in VER years than in non-VER years, as the model predicted, but this result does not
completely reject the hypothesis. Although production was smaller during VERs, it seems that
they were still responsible for bringing over at least four transplants and for the growth in
production in those plants during the VERs.
Hypothesis two, however, was upheld very well by the empirical model. The exchange
rate returned with a coefficient of -1090.71 and is significant at the. 000 1 level. While the
coefficient appears to be small, the model predicts that an increase in the yen/$ exchange rate of
one yen per dollar results in a decrease of transplant production of 1091 cars. One yen is a very
smaJl amount of money, about a penny. To put this in better perspective, the model predicts that
from 1985 to 1986, when the yen appreciated suddenly, production in transplants increased by
76,500 cars solely because of the rapid appreciation of the yen, a significant amount.
The wage rate also returned with a coefficient of the predicted sign, but with a larger
coefficient of -208729.23, also significant at the .0001 level. The model predicts that an increase
in the ratio of wages of one (which indicates a doubling of the U.S. wages relative to Japanese
wages) would result in a reduction of production of about 209,000 cars in one year, ceteris
paribus. Since labor is a major factor cost in manufacturing an automobile, it seems that the
Japanese companies have placed a lot of importance on the relative wage rate when making
production decisions, more than the author originally expected. An important observation of this
result is that this model predicts that relative wage was significant during the entire production
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span of the transplants, not just after the VERs expired. Therefore, relative wage seems to have
influenced production decisions even during the period of VERs, an unexpected result. Despite
this reservation, these two factors, the Yenl$ exchange rate and the real wage rates in each
country, both are supported as being very important factors in determining

u.s. transplant

production decisions, with the Yenl$ exchange rate significant only after the VERs expired.
The GDP variable was very significant with a coefficient of 65. 17. The model predicts
that an increase of a dollar in the real GDP of the U. S. results in an increase of transplant
production of about 65 cars. This small coefficient indicates that in and of itself, the state of the
economy is not influencing the large growth in U.S. auto transplant production, unlike the other
variables, but the high significance is evidence that production trends are affected by the state of
the economy, exactly as was hypothesized.
Finally, the MKT variable also was highly significant and had a coefficient of 11502.18.
With each percentage point gained in market share, the model predicts that production increased
by about 11,502 cars. As preference leaned towards Japanese automobiles and their market share
increased, Japanese companies responded by increasing production in auto transplants. While a
variety offactors could be responsible for the increased demand or preference towards Japanese
automobiles, the fact remains that as market share increased for the Japanese, they had an
incentive to continue that growth and increase their production in the U.S. as the model predicts.
In trying to evaluate the results of the model, I realize that the study supports hypothesis
two with some small reservations. First and foremost, it seems that during the times of VERs,
only one goal existed for the Japanese companies, to increase supply which would maximize
profits. During this period, the exchange rate was not the most important factor, and neither was
the wage rate. However, after 1985, when the VERs expired, the Japanese companies had a
choice. They were allowed to export as many vehicles as they wanted or they could produce
locally. As this study has shown, Japanese companies went with the latter decision, meaning that
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it was the most profitable for them. Multiple factors were important considerations during this
time, factors like relative wage, and probably others that were not captured by the regression
equation, such as parts origin and productivity issues. This differentiates it greatly from the
period of VERs where essentially only one variable, the VER, was an issue. As for improving the
results of hypothesis one, it proved to be intractable in my empirical estimation, again because of
the difficulty in measuring other strategic decision variables.

VDA Conclusion and Suggested Future Research
This paper analyzes the introduction and rapid growth of production in Japanese auto
transplants in the United States. Two hypotheses were developed, both of which were strongly
developed using basic profit-maximizing motivation and supply and demand theories. However,
only hypothesis two was supported by the results of the empirical analysis. Despite the
unexpected results from the empirical model for hypothesis one, the results were not
disappointing.
Hypothesis one is best supported by theory and observation of trends in production rather
than the empirical model in my project. In the results section, the reasons for this were discussed
at length, but it comes down to the fact that during the VERs, the Japanese companies had one
goal in mind: increase supply to maximize their profits that were restricted by the VERs. It is
clear that transplant production was their answer to increase supply and increase their penetration
of the U. S. auto market. Despite the lack of support by the empirical model, hypothesis one is
well supported by this project.
The second hypothesis was supported both theoretically and empirically. The results of
the empirical model fully supported the theory that the exchange rate was responsible for
increases in transplant production. Even stronger results could be achieved if one remembers
that, unlike during the period of restricted imports, Japanese companies had a choice of whether
they wanted to produce in the United States or not. In deciding to produce locally, the Japanese
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had several factors to consider, not just one, as is the case of the VER in the early eighties.
Although the model did not return an extremely high coefficient for the exchange rate variable
itself, the exchange rate is till very significant in production decisions because all of these factors
relate to the exchange rate. This is because their prices (and consequently their effect on
company profitability) are all affected by changes in the yen/$ exchange rate. Therefore, th
results of the model can still be interpreted to support hypothesis two since all input factors that
encouraged Japanese companies to produce more since 1986 are affected by the exchange rate.
In future research on this topic, an empirical model that captures more of these other
variables would be ideal for very strong expected results. One major factor that was not able to
be captured in the empirical model was parts considerations, such as their country of origin and
the number of transplant producers. However, as stated earlier, finding data as specific as this is
difficult at best. Perhaps including a productivity measure, such as unit labor cost, would be
beneficial to the analysis also, although relative wage is a rough proxy for productivity. Other
recommendations for the researcher with ample time and access to very specific data on the auto
industry would be to investigate how each company was affected by the VERs individually and
how that affected their order of entry into the

us. transplant market.

Another interesting avenue

of research would be to investigate the price elasticities of demand for the Japanese companies to
predict which models would be produced in the US. and to calculate exactly how much profits
they were gaining or losing because of the VERs.
This paper has addressed one of the most significant issues in the automobile industry and
explained it with economic theory supported fairly well by empirical evidence. This study took a
commonly observed trend in the auto industry and compiled and tested variables that help to
explain this phenomena. Few authors have looked directly at the effects of the VERs and the
exchange rate and how they have affected

us. transplant decisions, but many have simply

referred to the trend as given without upholding their theory. This paper has finally answered
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with considerable certainty why the Japanese have shifted much of their production to the United
States. The interesting results from this paper can help everyone to better understand the
transitioning U.S. automobile industry and the factors that have contributed to its transformation.
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